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Abstract
This paper examines the emergen.t security risk that information warfare poses to critical
infrastructure systems, particularly as governments are increasingly concerned with
protecting these assets against _at~ack or disruption. Initially it outlines critical infrastructure
systems and the notion of information warfare. It then discusses the potential implications
and examining .the concerns and vulnerabilities such cyber attacks would pose, utilising
exemplar online attack occurrences. It then examines the current Australian situation before
suggesting some considerations to mitigate the potential risk that information warfare poses
to critical infrastructure systems, and by association: government, industry and the wider
community.
Keywords: Critical infrastructure protection, information warfare.
Introduction
A key part of the greater national security situation is the continued availability and reliability
of critical infrastlUcture systems that provide and deliver services to an expectant and
dependent community. The underlying premise is that through their pervasive nature, these
systems and services have become integral to an improved standard of living for the
community generally. Furthermore, it is this very dependence and seamless availability of
these critical infrastructure services and the community's expectations, which would lead to
adverse, social issues and outcomes if these systems are threatened, fail or experience a
reduced level of service provision.
In this instance, depending upon the amount of time, which critical infrastlUcture systems are
affected, will invariably determine community reaction, incident management and
contingency responses. The major concern is that a deliberate attack on these clUcial systems
would adversely affect the function of government, business and the wider community
resulting in economic loss, and an inability to cope or respond diligently. It is the perception
that critical infrastlUcture systems will continue to provide services seamlessly that support
the standard of living enjoyed by most highly industrialised societies that largely goes
unnoticed until an incident occurs. Therefore, critical infrastlUcture protection is paramount,
and although different for every nation, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the large
proportion of the security spectlUm of any nation is no longer as secure or infallible in this
highly networked and interconnected online world (Webb, 2005).
The prospect of information warfare and the potential implications of orchestrated online
attacks are the focus of this paper and therefore, require a greater appreciation of what critical
infrastlUctures are and ~t defines these systems as critical. Before addressing the emergent
security risk of information warfare to critical infrastlUcture systems in the Australian context
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an explanation of information warfare including examples, concerns and potential
implications provides a foundation are given. Finally, the con'ilusions suggest the future'
prospects and approaches that will require serious consideration in the pretext of information
wmfare and critical infrastructure systems. However, this discussion begins with developing
an appreciation of the conceptual features of critical infrastructures.
Conceptualising Critical Infrastructures
Before determining an understanding of the conceptual aspects of critical infrastructure
systems, it is necessary to ask exactly what the term 'infrastructure' means and why it needs
protection. As Siroli (2006, p.35) states, "an infrastructure is a framework of interdependent
networks and systems, generally interlinked at many different levels, including industries,
institutions and distribution capabilities that provide a flow of products or services. Some
infrastructures are becoming essential, if they are not already, for the organisation, the
functionality and economic stability of a modern developed country." What denotes some
infrastructures as critical is the sense that they are indispensable to normal societal day-to-day
living expectations and that their failure, incapacitation or destruction would arbitrarily have
a debilitating impact on the economic security, societal stability, and physical security aspects
of a nation. Dunn and Mauer (2006) further exemplify this premise through the
interrelationships and dependencies that exist between electricity production and distribution,
transport, telecommunications and water supply infrastructures. If any of these infrastructures
were to cease operation for an extended period, the ramifications would h:we a rapid and
detrimental impact upon societal function as a whole. Therefore, it is important to recognise
·that critical infrastructure systems and their services permeate across many sectors of society
via very strong, system-based and networked relationships. For example, consider the
correlation between information and telecommunication, energy, banking ,and finance,
physical distribution and vital human service supply to identify a few (Siroli, 2006).
The proliferation of information technologies in the late twentieth century through access to
cheap, affordable, smaller and increasingly powerful microprocessors led to greater reliance
and incorporation of computerisation into many devices, from home appliances to defence
systems. Many organisations were also rapid adopters of information technologies to
automate routine processes supporting banking and finance, energy and water provision and
control, education, entertainment, government services, health care, and emergency services
management. Furthermore, it is the manipulation and integration of online information
technologies that has enabled new information and communication networking paradigms
such as electronic commerce, telemedicine, teleconferencing and telecommuting to deliver
almost instantaneous benefits via the internet and the World Wide Web interface (Denning,
1999).
A consequence of the rapid integration and convergence of information technology,
communication networks and the digitisation of sensitive information has enabled the easy
transmission of data passing across \Q;Secure, pubricly accessible communication networks
Where the exchange of information is more convenient and almost instantaneous. The
principle issues of the electronic data format are that while it makes the information readily
accessible to people in remote or distant locations, it also introduces security vulnerabilities
and makes it susceptible to theft, exploitation, alteration and sabotage (Denning, 1999;
Arquilla, 2007). '
Journal of Information Warfare 15
An Emergent Security Risk: Critical Infrastructures and Information Warfare
The Emergent Risk of Information Warfare
Coupling this communication medium with increased automation and the connectivity of
critical infrastructure systems has led to the development of interdependent relationships
where for example, computers and telecommunication infrastructures provide communication
and control support to the functionality of energy production and distribution systems. This
notion led Denning (1999) to postulate that adverse consequences would ensue with the
incapacitation of the entire public telecommunications for an extended period. Furthermore,
Denning (ibid) surmised that the proliferationA\nd convergence of information and
communication technologies has unwittingly delivered an environment suitable for waging
electronic, system-based information warfare. Thus, providing an alternative attack avenue to
launch deliberately orchestrated attacks and operations from remote locations, targeting
another nation's critical infrastructure systems without the physical impediments of mounting
a conventional military attack. Indeed, a single individual or a militarily inferior enemy with
some technological expertise and capability could launch an attack via the internet, as the
proliferation of communication networks presents a ready-made theatre of operations and
opportunity to wage information wmfare (Candolin, 2005).
Such electronically based, network-centric information warfare attacks represent a serious
threat to national security including the economic well-being of the nation. Therefore, the
protection of critical infrastructure systems underpinning the day-to-day functionality of the
nation continues to remain a serious concern for governments and infrastructure owners and
operators. Particularly, when considering that attacking vulnerable critical infrastructure
systems represents a high-profile opportunity to inconvenience the population, damage
business reputations or' the credibility of the incumbent government's ability to manage
national security effectively. Therefore, the identification of security issues and protection of
critical infrastructure systems from attack, accidents, sabotage or natural disasters is
imperative for any government of a modern industrialised society (Candolin, 2005; Libicki,
2007). Additionally, over their operational lifetime, critical infrastructure systems must resist
a formidable array of threats including from the natural realm: emthquakes; extreme winds;
floods; snow and ice; volcanic activity; landslides; tSUJ;1amis; global warming and wildfires
that all pose some degree of risk. Furthermore, there are other considerations such as system
design faults, prolonged service lives, aging materials, inadequate maintenance and the
increasing integration of information technologies and data storage capabilities (Little, 2003).
As Libicki (2007) posits, with each passing year an increasing percentage of the global
economy has migrated from the physical media and older electronic legacy systems of
telephones and telegraphs to the online accessible environment of the internet. For instance,
the electronic transfer of money between financial institutions was once via specifically
dedicated lines of communication isolated from public access, now these exchanges
intermingle with larger public networks like the Internet, as do some aspects of online
industrial control systems. This exemplifies the real security impetus that the accessibility of
cyberspace is increasingly critical to a nation's economy and defence, as its inherent
insecurity represents a potential avenue for enemies to perpetrate information warfare attacks
aiming to interrupt, cripple or disable a nation's critical infrastructure and communication
network systems.
To define information warfare more succinctly, Siroli (2006, p.33) states that "it includes the
actions taken to achieve superiOlity by affecting an adversary's information, information-
based processes, inform1tion systems and computer-based networks, while defending one's
own domestic information infrastructure." In other words, information warfare includes a set
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of activities intent on denying, corrupting or destroying an adversary's electronic information
and communication network-centric resources and capabilities tha~corporate both offensive
and defensive operations (Candolin, 2005; Siroli, 2006).
The Potential Menace of Information Warfare
In recognition of this, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) released Resolution
53170 in December 1998 acknowledging the security issues of global information and
telecommunications systems, which recognises the existing and potential threats of
information warfare in the field of information security (UN, 1998). Consequently, the UN
recognised an additional concern regarding information technology security within the UN
framework, and the potential consequences of misuse or unauthorised interference of
information technology and telecommunication systems or information resources (UN,
2000). Following Resolution 53170, some European nations including Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have undertaken
initiatives to analyse the vulnerabilities of their infrastructure systems. Austria, Finland,
France and Italy are also active in this area (Siroli, 2006). Therefore, protecting information
infrastructures and critical infrastructure systems from disruption has become increasingly
crucial to maintaining both domestic stability and national security (Dunn & Mauer, 2006).
Indeed, in his first national security statement to the Australian parliament, Prime Minister
Rudd (2008) acknowledged that the increas~ng complexity and interconnectedness of the'
global environment has blurred the classic distinctions between what is foreign and domestic,
national and international, internal and external. This acknowledgement recognises that an
increasing dependency on information technology represents a potential vulnerability to
cyber attack and the need to enhance electronic security. However, quantifying the magnitude
of the problem in terms of a large-scale cyber attack is pmticularly difficult with regard to the
potential economic and social consequences (Smith, 2008). The vulnerability of a cyber-
based threats or an outright information warfare attack is now a national security concern,
particularly in terms of the potential exposure of Australia's critical infrastructure systems.
Australia's critical infrastructure systems are similarly characterised to what other nations
regard as crucial to maintaining and delivering services that underpin the standard of living of
its populous, thereby requiring policies and laws essential to protecting, maintaining. and
improving the way of life (Abele-Wigert & Dunn, 2006). While a very general descliption of
the collective benefits that critical infrastructure systems bring to the community, it remains
that pervasive information technology, networking, interconnection and influence present
many potential implications for all aspects of modern community life. Including national
security and protection partnerships between privately owned and operated critical
infrastructure organisations and the Australian government (Rothery, 2005).
As Lawton (2005) suggests critical infrastructures are intrinsically important from a national
perspective, as they are one of the keY4ri'vers of the national economy, contributing to higher
productivity, prosperity, growth and the standard of living that citizens can enjoy.
Furthermore, people and businesses will judge a country's global competitiveness by its
critical infrastructure reliability, the mobility of traffic, the standards and promptness of
public transport and the cleanliness of the environment, are indicators of potential liveability
factors and those of doing business in general.
As a description of critical infrastructure systems, it remains generalised. Cobb (1997)
developed a description from an Australian telecommunications perspective and highlights
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vulnerabilities to technologically based information attacks. From this viewpoint, Cobb (ibid)
uses the term 'National Information Infrastructure' (NIl) to include and identify the following
critical systems:
• government networks across executive and government agencies;
• banking and financial networks including the stock exchange and electronic money
transfers;
• utility networks covering telecommunication systems, energy supply, air traffic control
and guidance systems such as global positionjrl"g systems (GPS), or instrument landing
systems (ILS);
• emergency services networks coordinating medical, police, fire and rescue responses;
• mass media dissemination systems such as television, radio, internet and satellites;
• private institutional networks supporting corporations; and
• education and research and development networks.
Although Cobb's (1997) interpretation of critical infrastructure systems, while important and
still relevant, remains a narrow and somewhat militaristic perspective of critical infrastructure
systems, particularly regarding the potential exploitation of vulnerabilities and weaknesses of
the NIl from a information warfare perspective.
Critical Infrastructure Concerns
Moreover, from Hyslop's (2007, p.l7) pe~spective "critical infrastructure (CI) is commonly
understood to be an infrastructure or asset the incapacitation or destruction of which would
have a debilitating impact on the national security and the economic and social welfare of a
nation." In this context, the diffusion of critical infrastructure systems extending across
various sectors of modern society, all contribute and deliver essential services to the
functionality of many aspects of the community. Typically, from the countries surveyed in
Dunn and Wigert (2004), the commonly identified critical infrastructure sectors within
modern society are as follows:
• finance;
• food supply;
• health;
• government services;
• law and order;
• manufacturing;
• national icons;
• transport;
• water; and
• waste water.
Existing within each of these sectors are individual and multiple critical infrastructure
systems that provide services to support and maintain the activities both across and within
these sectors. As Australia's Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) acknowledges,
from the economic perspective critical infrastructure systems support the activities
undertaken in such sectors as banking and finance, transport and distribution, energy, utilities,
health, food supply and manufacturing and communications including key government
services and national icons (TISN, 2003). This list is from an Australian perspective and is
not inclusive. Differing~ations will have identified their own specific security priorities
including areas, activities or sectors reliant upon critical infrastructure systems. Traditionally,
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these systems and services were considered in terms of tangible physical artefacts that were
seen such as pipes, stockpiles, or electricity pylons. However, critical infrastructure systems
and their services today also include those online activities that may be termed as 'processes'
such as the digital services provided by telecommunication systems, networks and the
internet (Cobb, 1997). Additionally, it is a reasonable assumption that society does not dwell
on the security of the underlying systems and services provided by numerous critical
infrastructure systems, which function largely hidden from immediate view in an increasingly
busy world.
Indeed the conceptual notion of a national critical infrastructure was ushered only' into the
public arena in the mid 1990s when the United States (US) began to acknowledge that a set
of infrastructure facilities and services were critical to the ongoing wellbeing of the nation
and its citizens. Initially the US critical infrastructure systems and organisations identified
were those providing electricity, water, fuel supply, communications, transport, the finance
sector, government and public services. Although infrastructure system failures do happen
and multiple failures are possible, the belief was that as long as they were not significant or
long term in duration, there would be no threat to the governance of the nation or the
wellbeing of the population. It remains evident that infrastructure facilities and services are
critical to government, business and the population and require protection at times of civil
unrest, and wars where it is essential to protect food, water and energy supplies (Jones, 2007).
While the physical security of critical infrastructure systems is self-evident, it is the increased
cyber interconnection facilitated by telecommunication system networks that presents real
and emergent threats, vulnerabilities and risks to the technological security of physical
critical infrastructure systems.
Potential Cyber Security Vulnerabilities
With ease of accessibility and convenience of the online environment for information
exchange and communications, governments and business organisations are becoming ever
more aware of the potential security issues of the Internet. Its convenience, dependability,
robustness and suitability for supporting large-scale networked systems have led
organisations and governments to become keen adopters of Internet information and
communication technologies (Rathmell, 2001).
An example of this change is apparent in manufacturing and industry process control;
typically, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems were reliant on their
own dedicated proprietary networks and hardware that isolated these systems from publicly
accessible networks. However, it is apparent that there has been a merging and incorporation
of common information and internet technologies including open internet technology
standards such as Ethernet and TCP/IP. This approach has enabled SCADA systems to utilise
public networks and systems thereby, removing the protective banier once afforded with its
own separate and dedicated infrastructure system. Additionally, the increasing
~nterconnection of these critical,~CADA systems has also introduced' issues of
lllterdependency relations between previously autonomous systems into the security equation
(Byres & Lowe, 2004).
Traditionally the core design and implementation requirements of SCADA systems focused
on reliability and safety of function, with security not a priority due to the typical stand-alone
structural architecture of these systems. However, security of these systems is increasingly
becoming an issue due to (TISN, 2005):
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• Increasing reliance on public telecommunications networks to link previously separate
SCADA systems is making them more accessible to electronic attacks.
• Increasing use of published open standards and protocols, in particular internet
technologies expose SCADA systems to internet vulnerabilities.
• The interconnection of SCADA systems to corporate networks may make them
accessible to undesirable entities.
• A lack of mechanisms in many SCADA systems to provide confidentiality of
communications means that intercepted communications are potentially readable.
.. A lack of authentication in many SCADA syste1nS may result in a system user's identity
not confirmed accurately.
Therefore, the integration of information communication technologies and remote process
automation that SCADA systems bring to critical infrastructure system management .and
operation, make SCADA systems an integral part of the nation's critical infrastructure.
Consequently, the move away from traditional stand-alone and dedicated communications to
information sharing via public networks, potentially exposes SCADA control systems to the
obvious security threats on the internet. Such as worms and viruses, recreational hackers,
disgruntled employees, elTors or accidents, electronic crime and potentially deliberate and
politically.motivated Internet-based attacks (Beggs & WalTen, 2007) which both Cobb (1997)
Denning (1999) describe as 'information warfare'.
Some recent examples of Internet-based attacks have been the Estonian and Georgian
incidents. In May 2007, a month long campaign of deliberate targeting of Estonian hosted
government and private sector internet websites with a flood of data came close to shutting
down the country's-electronic information infrastructure. In the initial instance, a flood of
junk emails sent to the Parliamentary email server forced it to become overwhelmed and
shutdown. In another attack, the perpetrators were able to penetrate the Reform Party's
website and post a fake letter of apology from the Prime Minister for ordering a statue's
removal (Landler & Markoff, 2007; Gardner, 2009). This began just days after the Baltic
state decided to relocate a Soviet World War Two war memorial, angering Estonia's ethnic
Russian minority and neighbouring Russia. Estonia is one of the more internet-connected
societies of Europe and alleges that this was a coordinated and deliberate information warfare
attack originating from Russia (Finn, 2007; Weber, 2009). What this example illustrates is
that with accessibility to the Internet via a telecommunication infrastructure can enable those
wishing to prosecute their own political agenda and perpetrate nuisance information attacks
via a sovereign nation's own telecommunication and information infrastructure.
In the second instance of orchestrated information warfare or cyber attack against a sovereign
nation, internet-based attacks against Georgia's information infrastructure may have
commenced as early as July 2008, well ahead of the Russian military mobilisation into
Georgia's South Ossetia region in August 2008. The preceding internet-based attacks were
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks that involved millions of simultaneous 'hits'
targeting Georgian hosted websites, which overloaded web servers causing them to crash. In
response, the Kremlin alleged that their media and government organisations had been the
focus of concerted internet-based attacks from Georgia (Asmus & Holbrooke, 2008;
Clayfield,2008).
These incidents are illustrative of the potential vulnerability and capability for such attacks
utilising a nation's ow~elecommunication and information infrastructure systems. Thus
enabling potential enemies or those with an agenda the means to attempt to cripple these
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networks via targeted internet-based electronic attack and by extension, potentially disrupt or
damage a country's critical infrastructure systems (Allard, 2008;~m, 2008). However, there
are a range of overarching approaches that can bridge the security awareness gap between
public and private sectors to foster cooperation in securing critical infrastructure systems.
One extreme is a top-down approach, where the government dictates and imposes
requirements upon the private sector such as mandatory reporting of incidents and
conformance with security and management standards. Alternatively, the other extreme is to
adopt a market-led approach where private sector market forces generate security solutions
through communities of interest or insurance-based mechanisms that essentially leaves them
to determine their own levels of security and responsibility (Rathmell, 2001).
What this discussion highlights is that security approaches involve taking both a local and
global view, as many infrastructure systems are no longer stand-alone or isolated systems. It
is the technological interconnection via public telecommunications systems and associated
dependency relationships and diffusion of information systems throughout critical
infrastructures more broadly, which requires a national approach to critical infrastructure
protection that takes into consideration the global perspective.
Vigilance and the Australian Circumstance
Australia as a sovereign nation is in the fortuitous position of being a sole occupier of an
island continent. It does not have to physically provide or share' significant critical
infrastructure systems and services across national borders and is consequently largely self-
sufficient. Characteristically, Australia's critical infrastructure systems consist of long, thin
,networks with limited redundancy and capacity for re-routing services. This is largely due to
the inordinately large geographical distances that some infrastructure systems must traverse
to supply their services to remote regions and isolated locations, as exemplified by gas and
water pipelines, telecommunications systems and electricity transmission infrastructures. This
is particularly relevant when considering the 'security environment that uniquely distinguishes
critical infrastructure systems from the Australian viewpoint, such as (Pye & Warren, 2006):
•
•
•
•
•
•
being a large island continent;
possessing largely self-sustaining systems with minimal need for sharing or reliance on
external infrastructures and services located or provided from outside the national
border;
some critical infrastructure systems have to traverse large geographic distances to reach
sparsely populated areas and remote regions of the country;
relative immunity and remoteness from foreign critical infrastructure incidents, although
this is not entirely the case from a cyber perspective;
due to Australia's,remoteness, there is a potential for early warnings regarding externally
based incidents and perhaps isolation from the effects thereof, however from a
telecommunications perspective, Australia is not in itself immune from the effects of
externally originating incidents,ijlG nor can it be expected to totally contain internally
based incidents; and '
the structure of the critical infrastructure incorporating infrastructures at global, national,
state, corporate and personal perspectives that also cut across various societal sectors
within these layers.
Therefore, the aim of Australian federal government critical infrastructure policy (and by·
association that of the infrastructure owners and operators) is to ensure continued supply
availability, by identifying and mitigating all hazards through information sharing and
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implementation of protective safeguards. These must address the identified risks and threats
posed to the ongoing integrity and availability of critical infrastructure systems and services
(Scott, 2005; AGD, 2008). The intention of the critical infrastructure protection policy is to
focus broadly on the following strategies of (DPMC, 2004):
• distinguishing critical infrastructures and ascertaining the areas of risk;
• aligning the strategies for reducing potential risk to critical infrastructures;
• encouraging and developing effective partnerships with state and territory governments
and the private sector; and , Ji")
• advancing both domestic and international best practice for critical infrastructure
protection.
In a practical sense, the critical infrastructure protection strategies relate to the plans and
contingency procedures necessary for preventing, preparing, responding to and recovering
from disasters and emergencies that include (TISN, 2004; ADG, 2008):
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
law enforcement and crime prevention;
counter-terTorism;
national security and defence;
emergency management;
business continuity planning;
protective security;
e-security;
natural disaster planning and preparedness;
risk management;
professional networking; and
market regulation, planning and infrastructure development.
This list is not definitive, but the security initiatives should focus on the development of
robust protective and rapid recovery anangements that involve identifying and categorising
applicable infrastructure in each sector, with a program of conscientious vulnerability
assessments of public and private sector assets for owners and operators of critical
infrastructure. This is because the diffusion of technologies, systems, telecommunications
networking and dispersion of ownership assets now presents security management challenges
for both commercial owners, operators and the Australian federal government.
Therefore, protecting the critical infrastructure systems that underpin Australia's economic
and social stability is a high priority for the Australian Government. The Trusted Information
Sharing Network (TISN) undertakes the management processes for information sharing
between government agencies and critical infrastructure owners and operators, for critical
infrastructure protection under the auspice of the Attorney-General's Department (AGD,
2008). However, the intimate machinations, merits and effectiveness of the TISN consultative
committee-like approach to managing the security information sharing processes, remains
outside the scope of this research and the incumbent federal government may yet change this
approach, which remains under review.
Conclusions
The perception of the wider community is that Australia's critical infrastructure systems and
the services they delivet"ftemain largely in the background, seamlessly providing the services
that support the standard of living enjoyed by most similarly highly industrialised societies.
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Governments and organisations involved in producing and delivering critical infrastructure
services are aware that possible system vulnerabilities, online atta~s, threats or information
. warfare attacks may adversely impinge upon the future security and functionality of these
crucial systems..
Although, the production and operational aspects of critical infrastructure systems are not
entirely Internet-enabled or directly controlled across the publicly accessible networks yet, it
is foreseeable that this may not necessarily remain the case. Therefore, it is imperative that
the control systems of critical infrastructure systems remain isolated from the public
telecommunication networks, including the internet. This cautious outlook should be the
default position, irrespective of future technological innovations and implementations or
business driven financial and competitive cost cutting to maximise profits, or simply
organisational information management convenience. As any publicly accessible network
connection or implementation of internet-enabled technologies into critical infrastructure
system controls, will invariably introduce connection vulnerabilities and a potential attack
conduit for those wishing 'to perpetrate information warfare attacks via the online medium.
Currently, the risk of information warfare attacks upon Australia's critical infrastructures
,remains low due in part to the government and the owners and operators awareness of the
critiCality of these key systems through the TISN. However, it is also incumbent on these
organisations to analyse and understand their place, security responsibilities, dependencies
and interdependency obligations within the overall structure of the nation's critical
infrastructure structure, including from the global perspective too. Furthermore, it cannot be
overstated t~e importance of maintaining an effective and ongoing assessment, examination
and review regime of the current physical and technological security measures. To an extent,
this approach would mitigate the changing nature of the online security environment and
should include investigating and monitoring overseas examples and experiences for other
newer, adaptable or more suitable methods and approaches.
While examples above did not necessarily result in anything more than an inconvenience to a
number of Internet accessible information systems and did not necessary impinge upon
critical infrastructure systems, it nonetheless exemplifies the genuine possibility and avenue
of information warfare attacks. While considering the current exposure of Australia's critical
infrastructure systems to the emergent threat of information warfare remains a possibility in
the hypothetical sense. It is incumbent upon governmental and industry decision-makers to
stridently analyse the vulnerabilities and threats and to furthermore, insist upon stringent
consideration with regard to future management and control directions of Australia's critical
infrastructure systems. This is particularly relevant prior to considering any incorporation of
online accessibility and the convenience of the publicly accessible networks into any critical
infrastructure system structure, in this increasingly online-enabled environment and network
connected world.
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